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radical than the
MPLA, UNITA
had the backing
of the Western
powers. UNITA was nearly
destroyed in the
autumn of 1975, but surviving
leaders managed to regroup and
form a second government at
Huambo in central Angola. The
second government controlled
the Ble Plateau, home to the
capital of Huambo and much
of the country's agriculture.
UNITA continued to oppose the
MPLA government despite continual defeats in both guerilla
and conventional spheres.

Ulterior Motives:
Understanding Castro's Intervention in Angola, 1975-1989
Jacob Key
uba has promoted the exportation of its revolution ever
since Castro declared his Marxist-Leninist beliefs in the
years after Fulgencio Batista's retreat on New Years Day
1959. Cuban specialists were spotted worldwide in the second half
of twentieth century, spreading political dissention in Latin America and overseas. The movements supported by the regime generally
took the form of grassroots guerrilla campaigns similar to Cuba's
own. There was, however, one notable exception: the full-scale deployment of Cuban troops to the former Portuguese colony of Angola in 1975. This was completely unprecedented in the realm of
Cuban foreign policy. Common explanations for Castro's intervention include ideological zeal and a desire to please his Soviet backers, but careful analysis of contemporary evidence suggests another
motivation entirely.

C

The country of Angola sits on the west coast of Africa, immediately south of the Congo and north of Namibia. The colony was
scheduled to pass from Portuguese to local rule in November 1975.
However, the Portuguese government was reluctant to specify a
specific group to empower, choosing instead to create a coalition
government from the three major factions left over from the war for
independence: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola,
The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, and the
National Front for the Liberation of Angola. Soon after the founding of the coalition, the Popular Movement maneuvered itself into
total control, beginning a bloody, decades-long civil war for control
of post-colonial Angola.
The Popular Movement for the Liberation ofAngola (MPLA) was
founded in 1956, making it by far the oldest of the three factions.
The socialist movement was based in the capital of Luanda, and
was composed of much of that city's intellectual community. The
Marxist ideology officially adopted by the group in 1976 gained
much support from the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc satellites.
Consequently, this move also brought the ire of the Soviet Union's
enemies, leading to Western Europe's and the United States' patronage of UNITA and the eventual progression of the conflict into a
Vietnam-scale proxy war in the 1980s.

The National Front for the
Liberation of Angola (FNLA)
appeared in 1962 as a separatist movement in the north of
Angola. Taking a backseat to
the larger conflict between the
MPLA and UNITA, the FNLA
was decisively crushed by the
MPLA government and most of
its leaders exiled or killed. The
remnants of the group merged
with UNITA in 1975 as part of
the alternative government.

Cuba entered the conflict
in late 1975 as a response to
a South African push through
what is now Namibia. At the
peak of the initial conflict, Cuba
had 36,000 troops on the ground,
more troops, proportionate to
the population, than the United
States had deployed in Vietnam.1 Cuban troops numbered
The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNI- 40,000 in 1986, and 50,000 by
TA) was formed in 1966. Populist in nature,
and far less the time of the final withdraw-
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gestion further solidified by the
third rule.

sponsored by the United States;
indeed, Cuba could not have
The rule of bargaining stat- asked for a better scenano,
ed that support for revolutions ideologically speaking. But for
abroad could be either cur- the intervention to qualify untailed or accelerated as a way der rules two and three, there
Scholar Jorge Dominguez to bargain with other nations must have been something in
lists four " rules" that guided for "specific advantages."4 This it for Castro. The most obviany decision Castro or his cabi- rule, like the one that precedes ous answer is that Castro sought
net made concerning the sup- it, gives priority to practicality to impress his Soviet contacts;
port of revolutionary move- rather than ideology. Indeed, however, diplomatic relations
ments abroad. They are the rule the rules of precedence and bar- between the Soviet Union and
of internationalism, the rule of gaining superseded the rule of Cuba had been stretched quite
precedence, the rule of bargain- internationalism in almost ev- thin for around a decade. "The
Soviets may now be close to losing, and the vanguard rule. The ery case. 5
ing their patience, and the Casrule of internationalism basiThe fourth and final rule is
cally is that Cuba officially sup- the vanguard rule, which states troites never had very much to
ports revolutionary movements. that Cuban support for move- begin with," reads a CIA memo
Castro gave a speech in 1966 ments abroad .are contingent on dated 21 November 1967. "Breconcerning revolutions in Latin that movement's willingness to zhnev thinks that Castro is some
America, Asia, and Africa: "For defer to Cuba on ideological kind of idiot, and Castro probCuban revolutionaries the bat- matters. This rule is perhaps ably isn't too fond of Brezhnev
6
tleground against imperialism the most interesting, and almost either."
encompasses the whole world." 3 certainly the most self-serving.
Cuba had in previous years
Marxism-Leninism and revolu- If Cuba only allows govern- become very vocal about pertion are often grouped together ments loyal to its ideals to come ceived Soviet failures both
in the popular consciousness, to power, how then does Cuba's at home and abroad. The Cubut it should be noted that for foreign policy differ from that ban government criticized the
Castro, one does not necessar- of the capitalist nations it so fre- USSR's domestic polices and
ily demand or imply the other, quently attacked? If these fo ur expressed disappointment for
a fact made clear by the second rules are any indication, it can its handling of Vietnam. On the
rule.
be argued that Cuba's motives other hand, the Soviets were
The second rule is the rule abroad were more often than tiring of its near-fruitless sponof precedence, which makes not errands of selfishness rather sorship of Cuba, its "socialist
beacon" in the West. 7 Indeed,
any effort abroad secondary to than nobility.
aside from propaganda, the supthe survival of the Cuban state.
Ho lding the intervention in
This means that Cuba would Angola up to Dominguez's four port and economic aid offered
not intervene in any situation rules offers a vision of Cuba's by the Soviets made little profit.
where the outcome would im- actions that is alternately con- The Soviet Union was hemorpede Cuba's progress as a state. fusing and enlightening. The rhaging money keeping up with
This rule, however practical and intervention fulfills the first rule all of its satellite states, not just
realistic it may be, still lends an easily. Antonio Neto's MPLA Cuba; Cuba however received
air of opportunism to Cuba's was a Marxist group operating some special consideration due
to its revolutionary beginnings
foreign policy decisions, a sug- aga in st
fac tion s
and its proximity to the United
al in 1989. Cuba's successes
in those first years were many;
South Africa was pushed back,
Cuba became a major player in
African politics, and the Soviets
were appeased. 2
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States. The largest aid the So- less violent positions in favor
viets offered were subsidies in of more patient ones, insistsugar and petroleum: Soviets ing the revolution wait for the
overpaid for Cuban sugar and proper conditions before powundercharged for Soviet petro- ering ahead. "Marxist-Leninists
leum. Since almost all of Cuba's have always understood that soeconomy was based on its sugar cialism cannot be transplanted
plantations, the most practical from one country to the other
way to keep Cuba afloat was by means of armed force," said
to buy its sugar. The Soviets Brezhnev. 10 All of these factors
were paying 482 pesos per ton contributed to Castro's frustrain 1975, as compared to 71 per tion with his country's reliance
ton in 1958. By
the same token,
of
factors
the easiest way
Castro's
to keep Cuba's
plantations run- country's
nmg smoothly
was to offer it
extremely low prices on petro- on Soviet aid. In 1968, a parleum, on average of 70 pesos ticular low point in relations
per ton compared to worldwide with the Soviets, Castro gave
price of 200 per ton. 8 These two a speech, exhorting his counmajor subsidies, as well as a trymen to "struggle bravely, "
plethora of specialists and tech- and to "to minimize [Cuba's]
nical advisors, cost the Soviets dependence on everything from
an average of $300 million per abroad . ...Let us fight for the
year during the sixties.9 The Cu- greatest independence possible,
bans were just as frustrated by whatever the price." 11
this arrangement as the Soviets
It can thus be safely assumed
were; their complete reliance on that Cuba's actions, while selfthe USSR meant that Castro's serving, were meant in no way
nation could never truly be au- to impress or seduce the Soviet
tonomous, and that Cuban pol- Union. Until recently, this has
icy was constrained somewhat been the historian's prime exby the wishes of its benefactor. planation for the occupation.

All
to

granted the MPLA by the Soviet
Union, as well as the planning
of the Soviet Union's "extensive" intervention into the conflict itself. 13 This view can be
contradicted on multiple fronts.
Joseph Smaldone, in the same
book, quotes statistics from the
United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency demonstrating the value of arms deals
between the Soviet Union and
a variety of African nations. Angola from 1967
to 1976 received $190
million worth of weapons and equipment, making it the fourth largest
recipient of Soviet aid.
However, this amount pales in
comparison to Egypt or Libya,
which received $2.3 billion and
$1 billion in aid. The four nations behind Angola- Somalia,
Nigeria, Sudan, and Ugandaaveraged $95.2 million in aid. 14
This amounts to $19 million in
equipment annually, roughly
6.3% of the amount the Soviets offered the Cubans in sugar
subsidies in the same period.
These totals demonstrate the
Soviets' miniscule commitment to the Angolans and also
shows by comparison the level
of its commitment to Castro's
Cuba, which by the same token
demonstrates just how uncomfortably attached to the Soviet
Union Cuba was.

these
contributed
frustration with his
reliance on Soviet aid.

The main area of conflict between the two Communist nations was their attitudes toward
the spread of revolution. Castro,
of course, believed in the export
of violent revolution from Cuba
to the rest of the world; the
Soviet Union instead adopted

The Angolan Civil War "was to
lead to a Soviet-backed Marxist
minority regime gaining control," wrote Ian Greig in 1977. 12
In Soviet and Chinese Aid to Af
rican Nations, published 1980,
Thomas Henrikson describes
the "lengthy and massive aid"
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Nineteen million annually
simply was not enough to sponsor a full-scale conflict, and
MPLA officials were quick to

complain of it to the Cubans. by Cuba. The United States beAgostinho Neto and Castro's lieved quite the opposite, clingrepresentatives met for the first ing to intelligence proving the
time in Luanda in August 1973. use of Soviet IL-62 transport
"In this conversation they also planes to shuttle Cubans into
complained of the little amount Angola. 17 A Cuban Ministry of
of aid from the Campo Social- Revolutionary Armed Forces
ista, and if Campo Socialista memo from the time shows,
wou ldn't help them, it wouldn't however, that those ten flights
help anyone." 15 Neto told the were chartered because the U.S.
Cubans that whi le arms trade had pressured many governwith the Soviets had resumed ments to disallow Cuban use
since a lull in 1972, they were of their air facilities, and even
very small ($19 million, accord- more importantly, that those
ing to SmalAngola is today one of
done above)
and were not
the world's top producers
suitable for
"vast of petroleum ...
their
16
needs." The
of
amount
aid was so paltry that the talks flights made up the entirety
at the meeting turned towards of the Soviet contribution to
further dividing the conflict into Cuba's intervention. 18 Another
imperialist and socialist sides in memo, written by Vice Minister
the hopes of gaining increased of the Interior Pineiro Losada
assistance from the Soviets. In- and dated 22 November, 1972,
terestingly, the memo describ- proves that Cuba was already
ing this meeting, from which researching the revolutionary
these quotations are derived, movements in Angola, and had
twice calls the MPLA a progres- already received requests for
sive faction. Whether or not this help from the young MPLA.
had any effect on either nation 's Most interesting about this docpatronage can only be speculat- ument is Losada's request for a
ed, but it is certainly something survey of the locations where
to think about considering Cas- battles might be fought: "We
tro's professed radicalism and suggested that we thought it
general reluctance to sponsor was a good idea to send some
moderate leftists.
of our comrades to the interior
The Soviet Union's general of Angola to learn about the
disinterest in Angola before the terrain of battle and to shoot a
19
1980s strongly suggests, con- film." This evidence suggests
trary to previous scholarship, intense interest in Angola and
that the decision to invade An- the MPLA, and also a very high
foresight.
gola was one made primarily degree of
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It has been shown that what-

ever Castro hoped to gain from
Angola, it was certainly not applause from the Soviets. There
must have been something
more, not only because of the
four rules, but also because of
the sheer size of the Cuban effort. While Cuba had always
expounded the idea of violent
revolution, it had always encouraged guerrilla tactics similar to those that had overthrown
Fulgencio Batista in 1959. But
m 1975, when open fighting
erupted in Angola, Cuba sent
in a full-fledged invading army.
Cuba, suffering under economic depression, could not afford
such an incursion based on
brotherhood or the prospect of
a pat on the back from Premier
Kosygin; there must have been
some golden incentive, some
objective of incredible value
that Angola could offer the Cubans.
Angola is today one of the
world's top producers of petroleum, ranked 14th worldwide in
terms of crude oil production,
according to the United States
Energy Information Administration. From 1975 to 1999, oil
production in Angola increased
by 500%, from $ 1 billion to $5
billion, despite the oil bust of
the 1980s.20 Angola interestingly enough is one of several oilproducing states wherein Cuba
tried seriously to incite a revolution; Venezuela, Bolivia, and
Zaire (Congo) are ranked 1Ot 11 ,
57th, and 66th respectively. 21 Recall that Cuba found the MPLA

to be the more moderate politically of the three warring factions, odd in the context of that
country's more common radical
agenda. Is it then coincidence
that the first moderate movement that Castro ever supported
after a long history to the contrary was the one that controlled
the oil fields? Northern Angola
was home to hundreds and hundreds of oil wells controlled by
the MPLA. Indeed, much of the
MPLA's funding came from oil
profits, up to 80% in the 1990s. 22
Angola certainly had the oil, but
was the petroleum worth a war
for Castro?

tivities in the Congo only by
way of Guevara's diaries, and
he had shown little interest in
Guevara's Bolivian campaign,
which proved a spectacular fail ure.

fields. If the United States' seven-year invasion of Iraq is to be
called imperialistic, so too must
Cuba's fourteen-year intervention in Angola.

Fidel Castro is too much of
This evidence, while certain- a pragmatist for the 1975 inly compell ing, is more circum- vasion of Angola to have been
stantial than it is direct. Howev- launched on purely ideologier, as Dominguez suggests with cal grounds. His opportunistic
his four rules, Castro was not nature and rejection of Soviet
one to let ideological concerns hegemony suggest that Angola
overshadow practicality when offered Cuba a reward worth
it came to foreign affairs. As fourteen years of conflict. An
he puts it, "Ideology explains analysis of what Angola had
the continuity in Cuban support and what Cuba did not suggests
for foreign revolutions; strategy that petroleum was Castro's
accounts for Cuba's choices of primary goal in the intervenCastro's distaste for his coun- movements to support." 24 The tion , contrary to most scholartry's reliance on Soviet oil has decision to invade Angola was ship concerning the conflict. An
already been shown, and in that a strategically sound one; Cas- abundance of compelling circontext it makes sense that he tro could not have foreseen the cumstantial evidence lifts this
would take any opportunity to length of the conflict, or that suggestion beyond the realms
break away from Soviet hege- Cuba's efforts would ultimately of suspicion into a hypothesis
mony, especially if the effort it- not matter, as the Berlin Wall worthy of consideration. Casself would be pleasing to Soviet was to fall only about a year af- tro's invasion may therefore be
Union, as was the case in An- ter the Cubans withdrew from seen as an errand of imperialgola. Castro was obsessed with Ango la. What makes Castro's ism, a fact that suggests ideolthe war's progress, spending up move so compelling is its very ogy's secondary role to pragmato 14 hours a day in a war room capitalistic overtones; that very tism in Castro's running of his
in Havana and in constant con- sort of economic exploitation revo lutionary state.
tact with his men on the ground was the sort of the thing that the
in Angola. Friend Gabriel Gar- anti-colonial MPLA despised
cia Marquez later wrote that in the Portuguese government
Endnotes
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